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Abstract 
The present chapter pursues the question if virtual violence is morally problematic 
behavior. Virtual violence is defined as any user behavior intended to do harm to 
perceived social agents who apparently try to avoid the harm-doing. The chapter 
reviews existing literature that suggests that users hurt themselves if they get en-
gaged in virtual violence and that users may also do harm other users if they direct 
their violent acts against their avatars. Recent research is reviewed that further 
suggests that users may intuitively perceive virtual agents as social beings. They 
may thus intend to do harm to other social beings (instead of objects) when con-
ducting virtual violence. The chapter also tackles (and denies) the idea that auto-
nomous virtual agents are living entities that may suffer from virtual violence. In 
light of the reviewed evidence, virtual violence is considered morally problematic 
behavior.  
Is Virtual Violence Morally Problematic Behavior? 
Nobody feels guilty about kicking a rock for the simple pleasure of doing so, 
but doing the same thing to a child is universally forbidden. What’s the differ-
ence? (Pizarro et al. 2006, p. 82) 
Ethics deal with the question if one should or should not engage in a certain 
behavior. In many cultures violence is considered an ethical issue. Many societies 
developed norms (and even laws) that tell about justified (or legal) violence and 
unjustified (or illegal) violence. Norms primarily seek to protect potential victims 
from harm-doing. However, developing norms about violence does not only pro-
tect potential victims, but also potential perpetrators. From a normative perspec-
tive that values a socially stable environment, a life of virtue, and the minimiza-
tion of pain, violence may also harm perpetrators, because it may reinforce or 
intensify dysfunctional or even pathological personality characteristics (Anderson 
& Bushman, 2002a; Berkowitz, 1993). Restricting violence does therefore not on-
ly help to protect potential victims, but also perpetrators.  
Ethical and legal concerns about portrayals of violence in the media are wide-
spread and have been pronounced for decades (Anderson and Bushman 2002b; 
Geen and Thomas 1986; Slater et al. 2003). Traditionally, concerns focused on de-
trimental effects of observing violence that is imitated by human-made technology 
(e.g., in television, music, books). Surprisingly, related discussions and (psycho-
logical) theories did not always draw a sharp distinction between the observation 
of real-world violence and violence in the media. An abundance of studies con-
3 
firmed detrimental effects of observing violence in the media (e.g., Anderson and 
Bushman 2002b), but the specific implications of observing mediated violence 
remained somewhat unclear.  
The growing popularity of new and interactive media, particularly video games 
and online virtual environments, revived - and intensified - existing concerns 
about media violence. In violent interactive environments, people may not only 
observe violence, but act out violence themselves. Thus, dysfunctional effects on 
the user may be even greater than the ones observed for non-interactive media like 
television (Paik and Comstock 1994). Indeed, an abundance of studies conducted 
within Psychology and Communication Sciences suggest that playing violent vid-
eo games induces short-term aggression (Anderson 2004). In addition, a growing 
number of longitudinal studies suggest long-term aggressive effects on the user as 
well (Anderson et al. 2007; Anderson et al., 2008; Hopf et al. 2008; Möller and 
Krahé 2009; Slater et al. 2003). In light of these findings, an ethical debate about 
virtual violence seems to be justified. Accordingly, politicians and lawmakers of 
key video game countries like the United States, U.K., or Germany started to dis-
cuss if access to violent video games needs to be restricted in order to protect us-
ers (i.e., perpetrators of virtual violence) from becoming more aggressive.  
The present chapter contributes to the existing discussion about the ethical im-
plications of virtual violence (Elton 2000; Luck 2009; McCormick 2001; Powers 
2003; Wonderly 2008). Both, users’ intention to do harm to others if they engage 
in virtual violence, and the actually inflicted harm will be considered important 
aspects when deriving an ethical judgment about virtual violence. The present 
chapter therefore illuminates if users can be considered intentional aggressors, and 
if users actually harm themselves and other users (and even other virtual agents) if 
they engage in virtual violence. In contrast to existing ethical discussions of the 
topic, the present discussion will be primarily based on social-psychological ap-
proaches. Because the existing debate about violence in video games and other 
virtual environments has not been free of misunderstandings about the subject, a 
clear definition of virtual violence seems to be a necessary first step. 
 
Virtual Violence 
 
Discussions of virtual violence, i.e., violent behavior in interactive media envi-
ronments, should be based on a definition of the term. Past definitions of media 
violence exist, but they do not seem to reflect the specific characteristics of virtual 
violence.  
Some Problems of Past Definitions of Media Violence 
Violence (or physical aggression) in the real world is commonly defined as 
”any behavior following the intention to do harm to others who are motivated to 
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avoid the harm-doing” (Baron and Richardson 1994, p. 7). The same definition is 
often used to define media violence: „Violent media are those that depict charac-
ters intentionally harming other characters who presumably wish to avoid being 
harmed“ (Anderson et al. 2008, p. 1068). For two reasons, Anderson et al.’s defi-
nition may not sufficiently characterize interactive virtual violence, however.  
First, the definition is about the media, and not about the user. It seems to con-
sider users as observers of violence in the media, which is indeed typical for non-
interactive media (e.g., television), and may also occur in interactive settings (e.g., 
video games). However, observation is not a significant characteristic of interac-
tive settings. The significant feature of interactive settings is that users actively 
manipulate the environment, i.e., they are agents. In violent video games and in 
other violent interactive settings, users are aggressors, rather than merely observ-
ers. Users tend to adopt the role of the character they play (Bailenson and Yee 
2005; Blascovich and McCall in press; Eastin and Griffiths 2006; Shapiro and 
McDonald 1992; Yee et al. 2009), instead of merely directing the character like a 
string-puppet. With more natural interfaces (input-systems and feedback-loops), 
users’ adoption of the game character’s role may only become stronger. Accor-
dingly, it is a characteristic of virtual violence that it is the user that is intending to 
do harm (Huff et al. 2003), which should be reflected in a definition.  
A second issue that deserves clarification when adapting the definition of An-
derson et al. (2008) is linked to the phrase about „characters who presumably wish 
to avoid being harmed“. One may argue that a character that wishes to avoid being 
harmed has to be a biologically existing agent, and probably a quite intelligent 
one, as simple living life forms may not pursue intentional behavior. However, to-
day’s media (or human made technology) are not able to create agents that would 
match the requirements of biological existence (e.g., Dorin 2004). Accordingly, in 
a strict objective perspective, media is not capable to give birth to characters that 
can suffer from harm-doing, or who may wish to avoid being harmed.  
Contemporary media technology can only create the illusion of living entities. 
Accordingly, media can only provide the illusion of harm-doing. Eventually, it is 
up to the user to believe in the illusion of violence (Blascovich and McCall in 
press). The user must believe that s/he is intending to do harm to a biologically ex-
istent agent. Anderson et al. (2008) reflect this notion by speaking of “characters 
who presumably wish avoid being harmed”. Media provides only imitations of re-
ality. Accordingly, media violence is eventually a perceptual phenomenon; media 
content is only violent in the eyes of a certain user. If users seriously doubt the il-
lusion, however, they may only see pixels on a screen instead of characters, red-
colored sprites instead of blood, or well-programmed software scripts, instead of 
violent actions. If users of violent video games, for example, perceive other things 
than scared characters and aggressive harm-doing when they move their cross-
haired mouse cursor over animated dots of ink that resemble the shape of a human 
body, it may be misleading to label their action “violent”.  
 
Defining Virtual Violence 
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A definition of virtual violence should reflect two aspects, then. First, in inter-
active media settings, violence is not only observed, but users become aggressors 
as they adopt the role of their game characters. Second, virtual violence requires 
the perception of others that presumably can be harmed, but apparently try to 
avoid being harmed. Accordingly, virtual violence may be defined as any user be-
havior intended to do harm to perceived social agents who apparently try to avoid 
the harm-doing. 
 
Ethical Implications of Virtual Violence 
Real-world violence is restricted by law to protect potential victims from being 
harmed. Virtual violence, in contrast, has become a legal issue primarily because 
perpetrators, that is, (adolescent) users, may harm themselves (i.e., become ag-
gressive). The discussion in the present chapter will apply an easy but intuitive ra-
tionale to ponder the ethical implications of virtual violence. In general, the 
present chapters starts out from the assumption that violence and aggression are 
inherently bad (Bufacchi 2004), as they potentially counteract a life of virtue on an 
individual level, and may dissipate social cohesion and stability of communities 
on a societal level. One may argue, however, that virtual violence only is morally 
significant if there is a victim, i.e., a life form or a social agent that is harmed. 
Second, focusing on the outcome of violent behavior, virtual violence may be con-
sidered the more problematic, the more severe the harm-doing to the victim (cf. 
outcome based ethics). Third, one may also focus on a morally wrong intention 
when judging behavior (cf. duty or intention based ethics). Virtual violence may 
be considered problematic, because it involves the intention of a user to do harm 
to other social agents that presumably wish avoid being harmed. 
Because the actually amount of inflicted harm is crucial when judging the ethi-
cal implications of virtual violence, it seems helpful to differentiate between the 
(human) user and (virtual) agents as potential victims. Based on such a differentia-
tion, three questions arise. With respect to users as victims, one may ask to what 
extent a user can actually be harmed by virtual violence. Are users hurting them-
selves if they commit virtual violence as aggressors? (question 1)1 Virtual vi-
olence can be directed against autonomous virtual characters, but also against ava-
tars that belong to other human users. Are other users hurt, if their avatars become 
victims of virtual violence? (question 2) One may also consider autonomous vir-
tual agents as victims of virtual violence. Such a notion seems far-fetched on a 
first glance, as harm can only be done to living entities. Today’s virtual agents can 
hardly be considered living entities, however2. A third question arises that is there-
fore the most philosophical one: can a (future) media character be harmed? (ques-
tion 3).  
Question 1: Are Users Victims of Virtual Violence? 
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Virtual violence can be considered a morally relevant behavior, if it has detri-
mental effects on the (human) user that engages in such behavior.  
Users may harm themselves. In the past, an abundance of studies from different 
scientific disciplines like Social Psychology, Neuropsychology, and Communica-
tion Sciences investigated the effects of playing violent video games on aggres-
sion (Anderson et al. 2007; Anderson 2004; Bushman and Anderson 2002). Re-
views reveal that most studies focused on short-term effects on players. Related 
studies have shown that playing violent games temporarily increases a player’s 
aggressive thinking, feeling, behavioral intentions, and even behavior (e.g., An-
derson 2004). An increasing number of longitudinal studies also examined the ef-
fects of repeated violent game play on the personality of players (e.g., Anderson et 
al. 2007; Hopf et al. 2008; Möller and Krahé 2009; Slater et al. 2003). The exist-
ing longitudinal studies suggest that more aggressive people prefer violent video 
games more than less aggressive people, and that playing violent games reinforces 
and may even increase aggressive personality characteristics.  
In light of the converging evidence that playing violent games increases ag-
gression, it appears that users harm themselves if they engage in virtual violence. 
The likelihood of getting harmed by engaging in virtual violence is comparable to 
the likelihood of harm resulting from other behavior, such as the risk to get lung 
cancer from passive smoking at work (Bushman and Anderson 2001). However, 
the problematic outcome of virtual violence (i.e., becoming aggressive) may be 
considered less dramatic than the outcome of passive smoking (i.e., getting can-
cer). Nevertheless, virtual violence appears to be morally problematic behavior, 
because it seems to affect users in problematic and harmful ways. 
Two critical remarks may be made, however. First, problematic outcomes of 
virtual violence have been primarily examined in the past in the context of playful 
environments like video games. Little is known so far if the observed aggressive 
effects apply to other virtual environments as well (McCall et al. 2009). Second, 
the present chapter defined virtual violence as harm-doing against perceived social 
agents. Past research has shown that users of violent video games may become 
aggressive. But most studies did not take users’ subjective perceptions into ac-
count. Therefore, it is not totally clear if the observed effects on aggression are in-
deed due to virtual violence as it is defined in the present chapter, i.e., users’ in-
tentional harm-doing against perceived social agents who apparently try to avoid 
the harm-doing.  
In order to ethically judge not only violent video game play, but virtual vi-
olence, a closer look on how users’ perceive other agents and violent situations 
depicted in virtual environments seems to be necessary. Exploring how users 
perceive virtual violence not only promises to illuminate problematic outcomes of 
virtual violence, but may be also particularly helpful in revealing potentially prob-
lematic intentions of users.   
Users may follow problematic intentions. Only a few studies exist to date that 
shed light on how users subjectively experience virtual violence. Neuropsycholog-
ical research conducted by Mathiak and colleagues (see Mathiak this volume; 
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Weber et al. 2006; Mathiak and Weber 2004) shows that users’ brain activity dur-
ing violent video game play resembles the brain activity one would expect in simi-
lar situations in the real world. In their study players suppressed their emotions if 
they engaged in violent actions in a video game, i.e., they tried to “cool down”. 
Results further suggest that the activity of brain regions that are important for em-
pathetic feelings toward others was diminished during acts of virtual violence. In 
sum, the findings of Mathiak and colleagues indicate that users respond in a quite 
natural way on violence depicted in virtual environments. 
Hartmann and colleagues (Vorderer and Hartmann in press; Hartmann et al. in 
press) suggest that virtual characters are getting increasingly less artificial and 
may thus develop into “something” a user cannot easily discard as an object, but 
may rather intuitively consider “some sort” of social and moral entity (Dorin 
2004; Elton 2009). Referring to the initial quotation by Pizarro et al. (2006), vi-
olence against today’s agents that are populating virtual environments may have 
less in common with kicking a stone, but may be more appropriately understood 
as a form of interpersonal aggression against another social being. In accordance 
to social-psychological dual-process models (e.g., Epstein and Pacini 1991; Smith 
and deCoster 2002), Hartmann et al. (in press) suggest to differentiate users’ spon-
taneous (automatic) perceptions from their more reflective (elaborate) perceptions 
of violence. Upon conscious reflection, users are likely to be aware of the artificial 
nature of media violence. Therefore, they probably consider the depicted violence 
to be “just a game” or to “have nothing to do with the real world” (Klimmt et al. 
2006; Ladas 2002).  
However, users’ automatic perceptions of violence may evoke another sensa-
tion. In two studies, Hartmann et al. (in press) explored guilt as an indicator of us-
ers’ automatic perceptions while playing violent games. Guilt can be defined as 
“the dysphoric feeling associated with the recognition that one has violated a per-
sonally relevant moral or social standard” (Kugler and Jones 1992, p. 218). Guilt 
should indicate if players’ recognize to violate a moral or social standard if they 
engage in violent video game play. If users would discard video game violence as 
completely artificial while playing (as many avid players claim upon conscious 
reflection), guilt would be an improbable response. Why should anybody feel 
guilty for “removing a sprite from a computer screen”? Players’ would not feel to 
do something wrong, if they were fully aware that they do not hurt somebody, but 
are actually only immersed in a illusion. In such a case, guilt is an unlikely re-
sponse. In addition, guilt should also not vary between different levels of justifica-
tion of the conducted violence, nor should it relate to other determinants known to 
affect guilt in the real world (e.g., violence against innocent children vs. violence 
against male soldiers). To the extent, however, players intuitively perceive their 
violent actions (and the victims) to be meaningful, if not to say: real, they may feel 
guilty for what they do, especially if the conducted violence is considered unjust 
and if players are rather empathetic persons. 
In the two studies conducted by Hartmann et al. (in press), justification of video 
game violence and users’ trait empathy indeed determined guilt in a structurally 
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similar way as in real-world scenarios: people felt guiltier if they engaged in un-
just violence, especially if they were empathetic persons. Similar to the conclusion 
drawn by Mathiak and colleagues, the findings suggest that, to a certain degree, 
players fail to acknowledge the artificial nature of the depicted violence.  
A plausible explanation of this result is that users’ automatic processes precede 
their more reflective processes while using a virtual environment (Bargh 1994; 
Smith and deCoster 2002). Automatic (i.e., intuitive, spontaneous, impulsive) res-
ponses are quickly triggered by the media environment, and can only be subse-
quently regulated upon conscious reflection (Zillmann 2006). Reality-fiction dis-
tinctions, which are key in the separation of the media world from the real world, 
apparently require operations of the reflective system (Smith and deCoster 2002; 
Zillmann 2006). In contrast, the automatic system seems to be incapable to judge 
what is mediated and what is not; accordingly, everything that is automatically 
perceived is subjectively real. Automatic processes seem to quickly form the im-
pression of an apparent reality, even if the sensory input was created by media or 
other human-made technology (Dorin 2004). The intuitive perception of virtual 
agents as social agents seems to accompany such an apparent reality, just like 
emotions that follow on automatic appraisals of the environment (Roseman 2001). 
Even moral judgments may be intuitively processed (Haidt 2001). Thus, feelings 
of guilt may have already been triggered before more conscious or reflective ela-
borations about the displayed media environment set in. Accordingly, automatic 
social perceptions, emotions, and moral judgments may all already exist, before 
users are even able to blend in their knowledge that “this is not real” or “this is 
just a medium”.  
Editing or regulating perceptions, emotions, and moral judgments once they 
occurred is, in psychology terms, quite effortful. It may be doubted, if media users 
are able and actually want to fully regulate or discard their automatic experiences 
(e.g., Harris 2000). First, a constant flow of incoming sensory information fuels 
the automatically established apparent reality, which in turn constantly contradicts 
the more reflective notion that “this is not real” (Meehan et al. 2002). Second, in 
the heat of a video game play or while being engaged in other interactive envi-
ronments, users may lack the cognitive resources to fully regulate their automatic 
impressions. Third, users may only rarely ever be motivated to continuously dis-
card their sensation of an apparent reality. Moviegoers, book readers, video ga-
mers, and users of other virtual environments all rather seem to enjoy believing in 
the automatically created illusion for a while (Harris 2000). Indeed, research on 
media entertainment suggests that the enjoyment of most media offerings is much 
higher, if users are able to believe in their apparent reality (Green et al. 2004), 
whereas reminders of the artificial nature of the depicted environment can be quite 
annoying (e.g., a program error, a badly designed character, a totally implausible 
behavior, etc.).   
Taken together, it seems plausible that users of virtual environments may in-
deed engage in virtual violence as defined in the present chapter, i.e., they may in-
deed have the (automatic) feeling to do harm to another social agent that seeming-
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ly tries to avoid the harm-doing (Mathiak and Weber 2006; McCall et al. 2009; 
Dorin 2004). To the extent users intentionally pursue their behavior, even though 
they believe they are harming a social agent instead of an object or “pixels on the 
screen”, their intention seems to be morally problematic (Powers 2003). Intending 
to hit another virtual agent does not seem to be the same as the intention to hit, for 
example, a figure in a chess board game, then. The intention to hit a virtual agent 
resembles the precarious intention of real-life aggression much more than the 
harmless intention to hit a chess figure.  
Question 2: Can Other Users Be Victims of Virtual Violence? 
 Many virtual environments feature mediated user-to-user interactions 
(cf., Konijn et al. 2008). A users directs his or her avatar to interact with another 
avatar that is navigated by another user. Both users may feel to communicate to 
each other, if their avatars perform symbolic behavior. User-to-user interactions 
that are processed through the virtual cloaks of avatars can turn violent as well, if 
users try to harm the avatar of another user that wishes to avoid being harmed 
(e.g., Hunter and Lastowka 2003). The most severe form of harm-doing against 
another user is referred to as “online player killing”, in which a player eventually 
kills another user’s character inside the game world (Whang and Chang 2004, p. 
596). The question arises to what degree users may feel harmed if their avatar be-
comes a target of virtual violence and eventually dies in the virtual environment? 
Research that examined this question is growing. Most publications, however, en-
tail theoretical discussions and only include anecdotical evidence of harm-doing, 
in place of systematic empirical examinations. 
Suler and Phillips (1998) provide a detailed review about different deviant be-
haviors in virtual environments. Based on anecdotic evidence, their report also de-
scribes hate and violence avatars that may make use of offensive language. Effects 
on potential victims are not examined, however. Powers (2003) provides a philo-
sophical discussion of the question if “the harms that some people claim to have 
suffered in cyberspace [are] real moral wrongs?”(p. 192). Based on speech act 
theory, he argues that virtual performances are a part of authentic social practices. 
As such, they are intentional, meaningful, and thus often powerful enough to hurt 
other users. “For these reasons, it makes sense to speak of moral patients as having 
suffered real moral wrongs, and accordingly to assign blame to moral agents for 
having committed these wrongs” (p. 192). However, according to Powers, virtual 
harm-doing may still not be morally problematic if it adheres to the (explicit or 
implicit) set of rules of virtual environments. Just like it is not considered unfair if 
a boxer hits his opponent in the face in an official box fight (e.g., Bredemeier and 
Shields 1986), virtual violence may be a fair action if does not violate the rules of 
the virtual environment.  
Huff, Miller and Johnson (2003) discuss a virtual rape that occurred in the text-
based multi-user environment LambdaMOO. They come to the conclusion that 
“perhaps the most important lesson is that virtual actions and interactions have 
consequences for flesh-and-blood persons and hence, the flesh controllers of vir-
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tual action, whether they control directly (as in playing a character) or indirectly 
(as in designing a virtual world), have responsibilities for their actions” (p. 19).  
A virtual rape is an extreme example of virtual violence, but even more com-
mon events than virtual rapes may cause harm to other users. In a study about the 
very popular Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG) “Li-
neage”, Whang and Chang (2004) note that a common event like a virtual death 
can be “a traumatic experience for some players, since dying comes with severe 
penalties with various consequences such as losing valuable player items or da-
maging the abilities of players, causing time losses” (p. 596). However, similar to 
Powers (2003), they concede that there are also legitimate forms of online player 
killing, if the action adheres to the official rules and norms of the environment. 
Whang and Chang assume that a “fair killing” of another avatar may also lead to 
less traumatic user experiences.  
Wolfendale (2007) stresses that users’ attachment to their avatars may strongly 
influence how much pain is caused it the avatar is hurt or even killed. Wolfen-
dale’s bases her approach on the view that “avatar attachment is expressive of 
identity and self-conception and should therefore be accorded the moral signific-
ance we give to real-life attachments that play a similar role” (p. 112). Many play-
ers feel attached to their characters. As people that seek enjoyment, they are also 
emotionally engaged in the online world. As a consequence, they may easily feel 
hurt if their character is harmed. Therefore, especially virtual violence against ava-
tars of highly involved users may be morally problematic: “Attachment to people, 
possessions, ideals and communities means that we suffer when these are harmed. 
If we accept such suffering as the normal human condition and as the price we pay 
for the joy that attachment can bring us, then there is no reason not to accord ava-
tar attachment the same moral standing common experience for many participants 
who are emotionally engaged in the online world” (p. 118, see Dorin 2004, for a 
similar notion). 
 In sum, it appears that other users can be harmed if their avatar becomes 
a victim of virtual violence, although systematic empirical evidence is lacking. 
The reviewed anecdotical evidence suggests that users feel hurt if their avatar is 
harmed, the more they feel attached to their character, the more the harm-doing 
violated existing environment-based norms and related expectations, and the 
greater the loss of time and monetary resources that have been invested in the vir-
tual character. Because it is wrong to hurt another user, it also seems to be wrong 
to hurt or even kill another avatar, if the user of an avatar felt emotionally attached 
to the virtual character, if the harm-doing violated game- or environment-specific 
rules, and if the killing implies the loss of a reasonable investment of time and 
money. Accordingly, virtual violence that is directed against other users’ avatars 
may be morally problematic behavior because it  may hurt other users as well.  
Question 3: Can a Media Character Be Harmed? 
Today’s media characters can probably not be regarded living entities (e.g., 
Boden 2000; Dorin 2004; Floridi and Sanders 2004; Ray 1992). Therefore, they 
cannot be harmed. But it seems a worthwhile philosophical question if human-
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made technology, specifically computer technology, may be capable to generate 
life forms, i.e., living virtual creatures, one day (a related discussion may also shed 
some light on the life status of today’s virtual characters). Eventually, today’s me-
dia technology may only be considered an intermediate step on the way to more 
advance technologies. A brief look into the discussion about computer-generated 
artificial life therefore helps to clarify if virtual creatures may qualify for potential 
victims of virtual violence one day.  
Since the rise of computer systems, a lively debate evolved about the possibili-
ty of artificial life (so-called “Alife”, e.g., Searle 1980) and particularly virtual ar-
tificial life (“Soft Alife”; e.g., Ray 1992).3 Life has been characterized in many 
ways, but self-organization, including metabolism, emerged as a core criterion of 
life in many related discussions (Boden 2000). Skeptics like Boden (2000) argue 
that virtual artificial life is impossible, because electronic systems (e.g., software 
programs or simulations) lack a physical body that would be able to metabolize in 
a strict biological way: “Metabolism […] is the use of energy-budgeting for auto-
nomous bodily construction and self-maintenance, and no actual body construc-
tion goes on in simulations of biochemistry” (Boden 2000, p.122). Other research-
ers, however, stress the evolutionary underpinnings of life and argue that software 
programs may evolve – and thus may indeed come to life –  within a digital envi-
ronment (Ray 1992; Spafford 1989). Computer viruses, for example, have been 
discussed (but also rejected) as a form of artificial virtual life, as they resemble a 
self-replicating organism (Spafford 1989). Similar discussions evolved around 
whether or not a virtual agent (e.g., software) may develop into a moral agent one 
day (e.g., Anderson and Anderson 2007; Floridi and Sanders 2004), and if soft-
ware systems can develop consciousness (e.g., McDermott 2007) or are capable to 
think (Searle 1990).  
A full review of these and related discussions goes certainly beyond the scope 
of this chapter. It appears, however, that skeptics that doubt the possibility of ar-
tificial virtual life (Soft ALife) outnumber the researchers who propose that virtual 
life may be possible. If the skeptics are right, ethical considerations of virtual vi-
olence do not need to consider any actual harm that is inflicted upon a virtual 
agent, simply, because virtual agents are not really alive: not today, but probably 
also not in the future.  
Conclusion 
 The present chapter aimed to contribute to the discussion about ethical 
implications of virtual violence. Related social-psychological literature (and litera-
ture from neighbored disciplines) was reviewed in order to illuminate virtual vi-
olence, and particularly the harm-doing that results from such behavior. The re-
viewed evidence suggests that users risk to hurt themselves if they enact the role 
of an aggressive character, because they likely become more aggressive (and thus 
support socially dysfunctional states and personality characteristics). From this 
perspective, virtual violence can be considered ethically problematic behavior.  
The reviewed literature suggests that users may also harm other users if they 
hurt their avatars. The existing empirical evidence, however, is much scarcer 
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compared to the abundance of studies that proved aggressive effects. The re-
viewed literature suggest that other users may only be harmed if they felt emo-
tionally attached to their avatars and thus suffer, if their avatars are hurt or even 
killed. The killing of an avatar may be especially distressful for users, if it implies 
the loss of considerable time and money. The killing of an avatar, even if it induc-
es distress in the other user, may be still a just behavior, however, if the violence 
adheres to the (official or unwritten) rules of the virtual environment (Bartle 
2009). Such an argument would be analogous to the justification of violence in 
sports (e.g., boxing), which certainly also implies distress and a loss of invested 
time and money for those athletes that are hurt (Bredemeier 1985). Still, the vio-
lent action may be considered appropriate, as all athletes willingly entered the vio-
lent situation and thus were able to expect potential negative outcomes.4 In the 
same manner, virtual violence may not be automatically wrong, simply because 
other users are hurt. Virtual violence that hurts other users should be considered 
morally problematic behavior, however, if it clearly violates (official or unwritten) 
rules of the virtual environment.  
Virtual violence may not only be problematic, because it has detrimental ef-
fects on users (as agents) and sometimes also on other users. According to the re-
viewed literature, virtual violence may also be problematic, because it builds on 
the intention of a user to actually hurt another social agent. Intentions are mea-
ningful. They tell something about the state of mind of agents. Intended behavior 
provides a message. If users intentionally engage in virtual violence, even though 
they intuitively perceive other virtual agents as social beings, their behavior would 
be problematic. Not because of negative effects, but because of an ill “wanting” of 
the users. Next to detrimental effects of virtual violence, it is probably the irritat-
ing symbolical significance of users’ intentions to do harm to others that raises 
moral concerns about virtual violence (e.g., Dorin 2004). 
To conclude: Is virtual violence morally problematic behavior? It appears that 
virtual violence is an ethically relevant behavior. Virtual violence features prob-
lematic intentions and effects that are worth to be ethically considered and eva-
luated. In light of the literature that is reviewed in the present chapter, one may 
conclude that virtual violence is indeed morally problematic behavior.     
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16  
Notes 
 
1The intention-based approach to judge virtual violence will also be considered 
when tackling question 1. The underlying question is, if users indeed intend to do 
harm to other social beings (as presumed in the definition of virtual violence), if 
they play violent video games or commit violent acts in other virtual environ-
ments.   
2It needs to be noted, however, that the conditions that constitute life or a living 
agent are lively debated among philosophers, biologists, computer scientists, and 
engineers (e.g., Ray 1992). Readers that like to learn more about this debate may 
also consult the scientific journal “Artificial Life”.  
3It has to be noted that the main goal of research on artificial life is to model 
life in order to explore and understand it. The debate about actually living soft-
ware systems (instead of software that merely imitates, simulates, or models life) 
is not of central importance to the general field.  
4The given example may also be misleading, as it may not fully match the defi-
nition of violence that underlies the present chapter. An important part of the defi-
nition of violence is that the potential victim apparently tries to avoid the harm-
doing. The opponents of a box-fight (or in any other violent sports competition) 
may certainly appear to avoid being harmed. However, the fact that they willingly 
entered the violent situation beforehand contradicts the notion of a victim that tries 
to avoid being harmed. The same applies to users that willingly entered a violent 
virtual environment. Accordingly, it may not be fully correct to label behavior 
“violent” that aims to do harm to those who willingly entered the violent situation 
(and expected the possibility to be harmed). This is not to say that virtual violence 
would never be harmful under those conditions, because it can still “amount to de-
struction of property, albeit in an environment where that is an expected outcome 
of participation.” (Dorin 2004, p. 108). 
 
